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Abstract—This paper presents a qualitative assessment of 
access control in database management system to guide those 
who wish to implement a discretionary or/and non-discretionary 
access control model and need some support to choose the access 
control in database management system (DBMS) best suited to 
their security requirements. To accomplish this we apply the core 
concepts related to access control models, and the metrics in 
NISTIR 7874. The result of this work shows how the database 
management system chosen, MS SQL Server 2012 supports the 
core concepts and the most popular access control models: 
RBAC, DAC and MAC, all these based on NIST 7874 metrics. 
Keywords— access control models, DBMS, NISTIR 7874 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper shows the result of a qualitative assessment of 
access control in MicroSoft (MS) SQL Server 2012, a 
commercial database management system (DBMS). This 
assessment is based on access control concepts, such as 
separation of duty and least privilege [3] and, the most popular 
access control models: Discretionary Access Control (DAC), 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Role-Based Access 
Control (RBAC). To accomplish this, a set of experiments was 
elaborated in MS SQL Server 2012 and a “real-world” 
database was used. The document “Guidelines for Access 
Control System Evaluation Metrics” [8] published by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has 
also been applied to the experiments and thus considers other 
aspects in the assessment, such as ease of implementation of 
control. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
II, background, is composed of three parts: the first part 
presents the NIST report and the quality metrics used in this 
paper. The second part discusses the main characteristics of the 
discretionary, mandatory, and role-based access control 
models, and last part describes some basic concepts about 
access control in MS SQL Server 2012. Section III describes 
and analyzes the DAC and RBAC access control supported by 
MS SQL Server 2012. Section IV analyzes the access control 
supported by MS SQL Server 2012 according to NIST defined 
evaluation metrics. The metrics are also used to compare DAC 
and RBAC access control. Section V describes the related 
work. Finally, in Section VI some concluding remarks are 
presented. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. NIST Assessment Criteria 
In 1992 NIST initiated its work on study of the commercial 
and government organizations, and elaborated several reports 
to help enterprises within industry and government to select the 
best access control for its systems [2][4][8][10]. The report in 
[8] presents properties for quality metrics of access control 
systems using concepts described at the beginning of this 
section. The metrics, built on those originally defined in [2], 
can be used when considering and comparing the properties for 
current configuration or future expansion of an access control 
system. The properties to be evaluated are divided into four 
categories according to organization’s operational needs: i) 
administration is the main consideration of cost, ii) 
enforcement capabilities are the requirements for access control 
applications, iii) performance is a major factor for access 
control usability, and iv) support functions allow an access 
control system to utilize and connect to related technologies. 
For each property, a list of functions needs to be considered. 
The information provided for each function in these four 
categories follows the same format. For each function, a list of 
metric items to evaluate is presented with supporting 
descriptions, among other information not used in this work. 
This paper evaluates the access control mechanisms of MS 
SQL Server 2012 on the basis of these metrics in practical 
experiments. Considering our case study not all metrics can be 
applied, so we have selected the most appropriate NIST access 
control metrics for the evaluation of access control in DBMS, 
as described in Section IV. 
B. Access Control Models 
Access control models bridge the gap between policy and 
mechanism, i. e. models can be promoted for their support of 
policy, and mechanisms can be designed for their adherence to 
the properties of the model [2]. This work is based on the three 
well known access control models: DAC, MAC and RBAC. 
As shown in [3] and based on Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), DAC is an access control that 
permits users to allow or disallow other users access to objects 
under their control. In database systems context, DAC 
mechanism allows users to grant or revoke access to any of the 
objects under their control without the intercession of a system 
administrator. DAC mechanisms are included in the SQL 
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standard, i. e. the creator of an object in a SQL database is its 
owner with the ability to grant other users access to that object. 
MAC is defined in TCSEC as follows [3]: “A means of 
restricting access to objects based on the sensitivity (as 
represented by a label) of the information contained in the 
objects and the formal authorization (i.e., clearance) of subjects 
to information of such sensitivity.” In DBMS point of view, 
MAC is not supported directly in SQL. RBAC is defined as: 
“Access to computer system objects is based on a user’s role in 
an organization. A role was seen as a job or position within an 
organization.”[3]. A role is essentially a collection of 
permissions, and all users receive permissions only through the 
roles to which they are assigned. Controlling all access through 
roles therefore simplifies the management and review of access 
controls. In DBMS context the RBAC features are: i) user role 
assignment; ii) support for role relationships and constraints, 
and iii) assignable permissions [6]. 
C. Access Control on MS SQL Server 2012 
MS SQL Server 2012 DBMS was chosen for the 
assessment to present to the reader a set of access control 
models capabilities in a commercial product. MS SQL Server 
2012 is one of the most influential and widely spread DBMS. 
SQL Server 2012 uses terms like users, roles, and permissions 
and, new words like principals, schemas, and securables [5].  
The database user principal is related to DAC model and the 
database role principal is related to RBAC model.  
As mentioned in Section II.B, SQL does not support MAC 
concepts, so SQL Server 2012 does not have natively tools that 
support this access control model. There is nevertheless a 
project called SQL Server Label Security Toolkit. 
III. ACCESS CONTROL EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS 
This section describes and analyzes the DAC and RBAC 
access control supported by MS SQL Server 2012. The 
experiments are constructed using AdventureWorks2012 
database. This database is based on a fictitious multinational 
manufacturing company. The company manufactures and sells 
metal and composite bicycles to several commercial markets. 
For the study we will create five logins on the server and five 
users on AdventureWorks2012. 
A. Practical Experiments to Verify DAC Mechanisms 
As described before, the practical experiments are 
performed in MS SQL Server 2012 using database users 
created in AdventureWorks2012 database. These users have 
the possibility to grant, revoke or deny permissions on their 
objects to other users, which are mandatory features of a 
discretionary access control model. To identify these features 
eight experiments were implemented. For the practical 
experiment of access control model we will also use schemas. 
For example, User1 is owner of HumanResources schema, and 
this schema contains several objects of AdventureWorks2012 
database. 
Experiment 1: This experiment verifies the user’s 
permissions (User1 in this case), when he/she is created in the 
database. The result shows that when a user is created he/she 
has no permission to execute any action in the database, 
supporting the least privilege principle. So, database user has 
no permission when he/she was created, having the 
permissions to be assigned by the administrator of the DBMS 
or by the owner of the object on which permissions will be 
given. 
Experiment 2: The goal of this experiment is identify how 
many steps are needed to grant, revoke, and deny permissions 
to a user. As previously stated, MS SQL Server 2012 has a 
way of grouping objects into schemas, which makes easier to 
assign permissions on multiple objects to a given user. The 
experiment shows that the number of steps depends on the 
existence of a schema; i. e. a schema helps the administrator to 
assign permissions on multiple objects.  
Experiment 3: The experiment’s goal is to verify if a user 
can assign permissions to other users, even when he/she is not 
the owner. In MS SQL Server 2012 this is possible using 
WITH GRANT clause.  
Experiment 4: The goal of this experiment is to revoke the 
permissions previously assigned to other users. According 
with DAC model, only the owner of the object can revoke 
permission. For WITH GRANT permission two steps are need 
and, one to revoke or deny grantable privileges, using 
CASCADE option. 
Experiment 5: The experiment’s goal is to verify if DENY 
permission takes precedence over GRANT permission. The 
result shows that DENY permission has precedence over 
GRANT permission. Notice, this precedence is also useful to 
solve conflicts, since two different users (for example, User1 
and User2) give GRANT and DENY permissions on a given 
table to another user (User3) , the conflict is “automatically” 
solved because DENY has precedence over GRANT. 
Experiment 6: The goal’s experiment is verifying the 
delegation of control administration between users. MS SQL 
Server 2012 permits the administration delegation between 
users using GRANT CONTROL option.  
Experiment 7: The goal of this experiment is verifying how 
MS SQL Server 2012 supports access control auditing and 
other type of access control information. To accomplish this, 
MS SQL Server 2012 has two audit levels: SQL Server Audit 
and Database Audit Specification. Using the last one is 
possible to audit the activity of a user. It is also possible 
visualize the information, using fn_ger_audit_file() a MS SQL 
Server function. MS SQL Server 2012 has tools that allow a 
user to visualize its permissions, such as fn_my_permission 
table. The administrator can visualize the permission on an 
object using the stored procedure sp_helprotect or on a given 
user using sys.database_permissions table.  
Experiment 8: The goal’s experiment is to verify the 
relationship between stored procedures and discretionary 
access control. A user can execute the stored procedure with 
success, for example SELECT, because he/she has permissions 
to do so despite the deny permission to perform SELECT. So, a 
user should be very careful when assigning execute 
permissions of its stored procedures to another user. 
B. Practical Experiments to Verify RBAC Mechanisms 
As described before, the practical experiments are 
performed in MS SQL Server 2012 using database users and 
roles created on AdventureWorks2012 database as well as the 
db_owner and db_securityadmin fixed database roles. Notice, 
members of the db_owner and db_securityadmin database roles 
can manage fixed database role membership, and every 
database user belongs to the public database role (for more 
information see [5]). When a user has not been granted or 
denied permissions on a securable object, the user inherits the 
permissions granted to public on that object. These elements 
are mandatory to implement role-base access control model 
using the experiments described below. 
Experiment 1: This experiment verifies the user’s 
permissions, when he/she is created in the database. The result 
shows that the public database role has no permission to 
execute any action in the database, supporting the least 
privilege principle; any permission has to be assigned by the 
administrator of the DBMS, for example. 
Experiment 2: The goal of this experiment is identify how 
many steps are needed to grant, revoke, and deny permissions 
to a user. MS SQL Server has fixed and a non-fixed roles, so if 
the fixed database roles are used, only one step is necessary: 
authorize the user to be member of the fixed role. Furthermore, 
if a non-fixed role already exists, only one step is necessary: 
authorize the user to be member of the non-fixed role. If there 
is no database role to support a specific access control goal, a 
new database role can be created. Afterwards, we can authorize 
the users to be members of the newly created role. So, we can 
conclude that the number of steps depends on the existence of 
the database role. Because a role is a collection of permissions, 
if you need to change the permission, this should be done at 
role level, and all users “receive” this changes through the roles 
to which they are assigned. 
Experiment 3: The experiment’s goal is to verify if a user 
can assign permissions to other users, even when he/she is not 
the owner. In MS SQL Server 2012 this is possible using 
WITH GRANT. Notice that the permissions can be granted in 
cascading, so the owner of the object must be very careful 
when assigning permissions with the WITH GRANT option. 
Experiment 4: The goal of this experiment is to revoke the 
permissions previously assigned to other users. The result of 
this experiment shows that only a role member can REVOKE 
permission given by the role. 
Experiment 5: The experiment’s goal is to verify if DENY 
permission takes precedence over GRANT permission. 
Concluding, DENY permission has precedence over GRANT 
permission. This precedence is also useful to solve conflicts, 
since the conflict is “automatically” solved because DENY has 
precedence over GRANT. 
Experiment 6: The goal’s experiment is to verify the 
delegation of control administration between users. MS SQL 
Server 2012 permits the delegation of control administration 
whenever a user was authorized to be member of a role with 
administrative permission. Notice, adding users to 
administrative role could enable unintended privilege 
escalation. 
Experiment 7: The goal of this experiment is verifying how 
MS SQL Server 2012 supports access control auditing and 
other type of access control information. As described before, 
MS SQL Server 2012 has two audit levels: SQL Server Audit 
and Database Audit Specification. Using the last one is 
possible to audit the activity of a user. This could be important 
in access control because we can audit any action related with, 
for example, database role members. It is also possible to 
visualize this information, using fn_ger_audit_file() a MS SQL 
Server function. MS SQL Server 2012 has tools that allow a 
user to visualize its permissions. One of these tools was 
explained in Section III. A., the fn_my_permission table.  
Experiment 8: The goal’s experiment is to verify the 
relationship between stored procedures and role based access 
control. The result is that a user can execute SELECT on a 
table using the stored procedure, because he/she has 
permissions to do so despite the DENY SELECT permission 
on a table. So, a user should be very careful when assign 
execute permissions on stored procedures to another user. 
IV. ACCESS CONTROL EVALUATION BASED ON NIST METRICS 
This section analyzes the access control supported by MS 
SQL Server 2012 according to NIST defined evaluation 
metrics. The metrics are also used to compare DAC and RBAC 
access control supported by MS SQL Server 2012. We have 
selected the following NIST 7874 properties for the evaluation 
of access control according to the practical experiment 
categories described before: i) administration and ii) 
enforcement capabilities. For each property, a list of functions 
needs to be considered. The analysis is presented for each item 
of the selected functions. The scale applied to the items is the 
following. 
• Full support - When all function items are supported by 
the DBMS; 
• Partial support - When some function items are 
supported by the DBMS; 
• Not support - When none function items are supported 
by the DBMS; 
• Not applicable – When function items cannot be 
measured, because they are not at the database level. 
The items for the auditing function from administration 
category are analyzed in Table I. 
TABLE I 
AUDITING ITEMS 
Metric Items to Evaluate Analysis 
Does the AC system log system 
failure? 
Not applicable in this case study. 
MS SQL Server supports this item at 
server level. 
Does the AC system log denied 
access requests? 
Full support according with 
experiment 7 from Sections III.A 
and III.B 
Does the AC system log granted 
access requests? 
Full support according with 
experiment 7 from Sections III.A 
and III.B 
Does the AC system provide 
additional log functions required by 
the organization? 
Not applicable in this case study. 
MS SQL Server supports this item at 
server level. 
Does the AC system provide 
additional log functions required by 
the organization? 
Not applicable in this case study. 
MS SQL Server supports this item at 
server level. 
According with the analysis, the auditing function is fully 
supported by MS SQL Server 2012.  
The items in the privileges/capabilities discovery function, 
from administration category, are analyzed in Table II. 
TABLE II 
PRIVILEGES/CAPABILITIES DISCOVERY ITEMS 
Metric Items to Evaluate Analysis 
Does the system provide query/display 
for (constrained) privileges/capabilities 
discovery? 
Partial support according with 
experiments 7 and 8 from Sections 
III.A and III.B. A user with 
permission to execute a stored 
procedure can make the action 
contained therein, without being 
shown that this user is allowed, or 
not, to perform that action. 
Does the system provide graphic 
display? 
No support. 
According to the analysis previously achieved, the 
privileges/capabilities discovery function is partial supported 
by MS SQL Server 2012. Notice, some items for this function 
is not applicable, as we said before, for example, “Does the 
system provide query/display for AC system states discovery 
for (constrained) privileges/capabilities?”  
For the ease of privilege assignments function from 
administration category, the items are analyzed in Table III. 
TABLE III 
EASY OF PRIVILEGE ASSIGNMENTS ITEMS 
Metric Items to Evaluate Analysis 
How many steps are required for 
assigning/changing/removing 
privilege or a capability to a 
subject/subject group? 
Full support according with 
experiments 2, 3 and 4 from Section 
III.B (RBAC). As described before 
RBAC offers administrative benefits in 
assigning/revoking subjects and 
capabilities, i. e., with few steps. 
Partial support according with 
experiments 2, 3 and 4 from Section 
III.A (DAC) because is not possible to 
assign privileges to subject group.  
Notice, MS SQL Server has the 
concept of schema to minimize the 
number of steps. 
How many steps are required for 
assigning subject groups and group 
relations or assigning object groups 
and group relations? 
Full support according with 
experiments 2, 3 and 4 from Section 
III:B (RBAC). As described before 
RBAC offers administrative benefits in 
assigning/revoking subjects and 
capabilities, i. e., with few steps. 
No supported according with 
experiments 2, 3 and 4 from Section 
III.A (DAC) because is not possible to 
assign privileges to subject group.  
Notice, MS SQL Server has the 
concept of schema to minimize the 
number of steps. 
How many steps are required for 
assigning privilege inheritance? 
Full support according with 
experiments 2, 3 and 4 from Section 
III.B (RBAC). Notice, in RBAC case a 
subject X is assigned to database 
roleA, which has access privileges 
from database roleB, and then X 
automatically inherits all the privileges 
of B. 
No support according with 
experiments 2, 3 and 4 from Section 
III.A (DAC). 
According to the analysis previously conducted, easy of 
privilege assignments function is fully supported by MS SQL 
Server 2012, when RBAC access control is used. When DAC 
access control is used, MS SQL Server partially supports easy 
of privilege assignments function.  
For the delegation of administrative capabilities function 
from administration category, the item is analyzed in Table 
IV. 
TABLE IV 
DELEGATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITIES ITEMS 
Metric Items to Evaluate Analysis 
Does the AC system allow policy 
administration delegation? 
Full support according with 
experiment 6 from section III.A and 
III.B. 
According to the analysis previously achieved, delegation 
of administrative capabilities function is fully supported by 
MS SQL Server 2012. For the least privilege principle support 
function from enforcement category, the items are analyzed in 
Table V. 
TABLE V 
LEAST PRIVILEGE PRINCIPLE SUPPORT ITEMS 
Metric Items to Evaluate Analysis 
Is the AC system capable of enforcing 
the least privilege principle? 
Full support according with 
experiment 1 from section III.A and 
III.B. 
Does the AC system allow specifying 
least privilege via constraints? 
No support. 
Does the AC system allow specifying 
least privilege via other 
specifications? 
No support. 
According to the analysis previously achieved, least 
privilege principle function is partial supported by MS SQL 
Server 2012.  
For the Separation of Duty (SoD) function from 
enforcement category, the items are analyzed in Table VI. 
TABLE VI 
SEPARATION OF DUTY (SOD) ITEMS 
Metric Items to Evaluate Analysis 
Is the AC system capable of 
specifying Static SoD rules? 
Full support according to role 
definition in MS SQL Server, i.e., 
when use RBAC access control.  
Is the AC system capable of 
specifying Dynamic SoD rules? 
Not supported since MS SQL Server 
does not support Chinese Wall 
policy. 
Is the AC system capable of 
specifying Historical SoD rules? 
Not supported since MS SQL Server 
does not support Clark-Wilson 
policy. 
According to the analysis previously achieved, SoD 
function is partially supported by MS SQL Server 2012. 
Notice, MS SQL Server supports SoD when RBAC access 
control is used.  
For the safety (confinements and constraints) function from 
enforcement category, the items are analyzed in Table VII. 
TABLE VII 
SAFETY (CONFINEMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS) 
Metric Items to Evaluate Analysis 
Does the AC system provide safety 
check capabilities to prevent leaking 
of permissions? 
Partial support according with 
experiments 3, 4 and 8 from Sections 
III.A and III.B. WITH GRANT 
clause and execution of stored 
procedures can leak permissions. 
According to the analysis previously achieved, safety 
function is partially supported by MS SQL Server 2012.  
For the conflict resolution or prevention function from 
enforcement category, the items are analyzed in Table VIII. 
TABLE VIII 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION OR PREVENTION ITEMS 
Metric Items to Evaluate Analysis 
Is the AC system capable of 
preventing policy rule conflicts? 
Full support according with 
experiments 5 and 6 from section 
III.A and III.B. DENY permission 
has precedence over GRANT 
permission. 
Is the AC system capable of 
resolving conflict policy rules? 
Full support according with 
experiments 5 and 6 from section 
III.A and III.B. DENY permission 
has precedence over GRANT 
permission. 
According to the analysis previously achieved, conflict 
resolution function is full supported by MS SQL Server 2012. 
Finally, Table IX shows a comparative analysis of DAC and 
RBAC access control supported by MS SQL Server 2012 
based on NIST functions described above. 
TABLE IX 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DAC AND RBAC 
NIST functions DAC RBAC 
Auditing Full support Full support 
Privileges / capabilities 
discovery 
Partial support Partial support 
Ease of privileges 
assignments 
Partial support Full support 
Delegation of administrative 
capabilities 
Full support Full support 
Least privilege principle 
support 
Partial support Partial support 
Separation of Duty No support Partial support 
Safety (confinements and 
constraints) 
Partial support Partial support 
Conflict resolution or 
prevention 
Full support Full support 
According to the analysis previously achieved, the RBAC 
model has a slight advantage on the DAC model in the MS 
SQL Server 2012 context, considering ease of privileges 
assignments and separation of duty metrics. 
V. RELATED WORK 
The work in [3] analyzes and discuss RBAC in the context 
of DBMS products (Informix, Sybase and Oracle) based on i) 
role creation; ii) user role assignments and role propagation; 
iii) role activation; iv) creation of role hierarchies and 
constraints; and v) assignable privileges. In this paper some of 
the above criteria i), ii), v) are used to analyze and discuss 
access control models (DAC, MAC and RBAC) of a well-
known DBMS: MS SQL Server 2012. The analysis and 
discussion have been improved using NISTIR 7874 criterion.  
In [7] existing cloud based access control system were 
analyzed and evaluated using NIST access control systems 
evaluation criteria. Our work differs from this because we use 
a commercial database management system and the concept of 
discretionary and non-discretionary access control models. 
The paper [1] presented the basic concepts of access control 
and investigated different issues to address the needs of an 
access control system. Also, the work in [9] discusses basic 
concepts about access control, showing the main 
characteristics of the discretionary, mandatory, and role-based 
access control policies along with their advantages and 
disadvantages. These two works were used to inspire the 
assessment proposed here; in particular the concepts about 
access control were the basis of our work. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, detailed analysis is performed for DAC and 
RBAC access control mechanisms in MS SQL Server 2012, a 
commercial DBMS. Our analysis shows that the MS SQL 
Server access control mechanisms target the main aspects of 
DAC and RBAC models. Also, some aspects were identified 
that can hamper the access control policy, such as procedures. 
Based on the guidelines for access control system 
evaluation metrics (NIST 7874), RBAC model has a slight 
advantage on the DAC model in the MS SQL Server 2012 
context. This smallest advantage is mainly due to privileges 
assignment issues, specially administrative. During the 
application of the evaluation metrics proposed by NIST, some 
difficulties have arisen. For example, it was not easy to apply 
the scale to the item related to the number of steps of ease of 
privileges assignments metric. Also, there is no available 
documentation with examples of practical application of NIST 
metrics. 
For future work we will apply performance and support 
metrics to MS SQL Server; test another commercial DBMS 
and compare the results with MS SQL Server; use a real-world 
access control policy. 
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